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CoNCLUSION

It appears that a reservist does not have rights protected to the
same degree by the Constitution as do his fellow citizens who are
civilians. Likewise, his access to the courts for review of administrative proceedings appears more constricted than his civilian counterpart. The terms of the very agreement he signed that made him a
member of the reserves are subject to modification by Congress in
the exercise of some paramount sovereign power. These impairments of liberty are adequately justified by the courts; indeed
there are few citizens who would question the need of the military
for discipline at the expense of some individual liberties.
Problems sometimes arise when the soldier is also a civilian, or
perhaps, when he is neither soldier nor civilian, but in limbo between the two worlds and forced to live in both. For example, he is subject to the same rigid discipline as a full-time soldier,
but only for a few days each month. The effects of this discipline,·
however, often persist beyond the end of his drill (a man with short
hair on the week.end rarely has long hair the following week., though
he has the same freedom to wear lo_ng hair then as any civilian) .
· Problems involving reservists multiplied with the Viet Nam
War; after its end we shall see a corresponding reduction in litigation. These problems have helped define more clearly the rights
and obligations of reservists.

William Robert Wooton

Constitutional Law - Judicial Review of
Congressional Membership Exclusion
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. was duly elected from the
Eighteenth Congressional District of New York to serve in the
House of Representatives for the Ninetieth Congress. During the
Eighty-ninth Congress, a special subcommittee of the ~ouse had
reported that the Committee on Education and· Labor, of which
Powell was chairman, had deceived the House authorities as to
travel expenses and, additionally, that there was strong evidence
that Powell had directed illegal salanr payments to his wife. Consequently, when the Ninetieth Congress organized in January, 1967;
the oath was not administered to Powell. On February 23, 1967, a
select committee of the Ninetieth Congress issued a report, finding
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that Powell met the standing qualifications of the Constitution,'
but that he had asserted unwarranted privileges and immunities
from the processes of the New York courts and had wrongfully
used House funds. On March l, 1967, the House, purporting to act
under constitutional authority; excluded Powell by a vote of 307116. Powell then filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the
House could exclude him only if he failed to meet the standing
constitutional qualifications of age, citizenship and residency, all
of which the House specifically found that Powell met. The district
court dismissed the petitioners' complaint for want of subject
matter jurisdiction and the court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed.
The Court declared that the House exceeded its authority in the
exchision of Powell. In response to petitioners' request for additional
equitable relief, including mandamus for back pay, the Court
reversed and remanded. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
The Powell case presented the Court with at least five major
questions. First, was Powell's claim rendered moot by his subsequent
election to and seating in the Ninety-first Congress? Second, were
the respondents immune from judicial review by virtue of the
speech and debate clause of the Constitution? Third, was the House
authority to exclude in its authority to expel? Fourth, did the Court
lack subject matter jurisdiction? Fifth, was the case non-justiciable
as a "political question"?" The Court considered each of these ques- _
tions at length and answered all of them in the negative. The scope
of this comment, however, is limited to the Court's discussion of
the political question doctrine.
Respondents maintained that even if the case were otherwise
justiciable, it presented only a political question: which, by wellestablished principle, federal courts will not adjudicate.• Writing
'US. CoNST. art. I, § 2 provides as follows: ''No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty·flve Years, and been seven
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhibitant of that State in whi.ch he shall be chosen."
• U.S. CoNST. art. I§ 5 provides as follows: "Each House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members . . . ."
• Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 495 (1969).
"Id. at 518.
,
• In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) l (1849), the first important United
States case to apply the doctrine of non•intervention with political questions,
the Court declined to determine which of two Rhode Island governments was
the legitimate one. Over a half century later, the Court declared that the
question of who is the de facto or de jure sovereign of a territory ii; a political
question, the legislative or executive determination of which binds the judge;.
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for the Court, Chief Justice Warren relied on the legislative apportionment case of Baker v. Carr' for a functional definition of a
"political question": In the Baker majority opinion, Mr. Justice
Brennan had noted that" [t]he nortjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers."" The Baker
Court then specified that a question was "political" when there
existed "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department."' This definition of a
political question primarily bars judicial review of the actions of a
coordinate branch of government. Mr. Justice Brennan rejected the
traditional categorization•• of political question issues and called
for a determination of justiciability on an ad hoc basis.''
In the Powell case, the respondents argued that the case presented a political question because there is a textually demonstrable
commitment to the House of Representatives of the "adjudicatory
power" to determine Powell's qualifications." The Court was,
therefore, called upon to determine for the first time the scope of

Detjen v. Central Leathe1· Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). Later, ~ Colegr_ove_ v. ·
Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), petitioners alleged that the congressional districts
created by Illinois law were malapportioned under the fourteenth amendment.
Mr. Justice Fran~f;1-rter, writing for the majority, declare~ ~~t the illsu~ w:15
a "peculiarly pohUcal nature and therefore not meet for Judiaal detenn1nat10.n.
Id. at 552. For practical purposes. Colegrove wa& overruled by Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962). However, Professor Bickel argues that Baker v. Carr does
not deny the "essence" of Colegrove, because Colegrove did not hold that the
Court may nevm- interfere with the electoral process. Bickel, The Durability of
Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L. J. 39 (1962).
"369 U.S. 186 (1962).
• 395 U.S. at 518-9.
• 369 U.S. at 210.
"Id. at 217. A political question was also deemed to exist where there was
present "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for. resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question." Id.
•• The general subjects which the courts have traditionally deemed "politi·
cal" are: negotiations violation and termination of treaties; beginning and ending
of wars; admission and deportation of aliens;. jurisdiction over territories;
recognition of states and governments; war and measures short of war; status of
Indian tribes; and the guaranty of republican form of government. Field, The
Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Ca-urts, 8 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1924-).
"369 U.S. at 210-11.
12 395 U.S. at 519. Respondents based their claim on Ar tide l, section 5 of the
Constitution. See note l, supra.

~!
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the constitutional commitment to Congress of the power to judge
the qualifications of its own members."'
Chief Justice Warren relied on historical precedent, which he
divided into three basic periods," in order to support the Court's
decision that both Houses of Congress are without authority to
exclude any duly elected person who meets the constitutional qualifications for membership.'" The Chief Justice concluded that the
pre-Constitutional Convention cases of Parliamentary exclusion,
including, notably, the Robert Walpole case, "demonstrate that a
member could be excluded if he had first been expelled."'" Nevertheless, over a century later, the exclusion of John Wilkes from the
House of Collilllons, contemporanous with the American Revolution, had a profound effect on the Founding Fathers.'' Wilkes was
expelled from Commons for seditious libel in 1763, and, although
re-elected five times, was denied his seat until 1782." Chief Justice
Warren agreed with the petitioners' conclusion that the Founding
Fathers manifested their intention to deny Congress the power to
alter the constitutional qualification for membership.'' Accordingly,
for nearly one hundred years, Congress "limited its power to judge
the qualifications of its members to those enumerated in the Constitution.""'
""The Court had applied the. Baker rest in Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116
(1966), and concluded that the judiciary has the power to review a state 1egislature's exclusion of a duly elected member. Id. at 131. Julian Bond was elected
to the Georgia House of Representatives in 1965 and subsequently endorned a
Student Coordinating Committee statement against the government's Vietnam
policy. The House refused to seat him on the grounds that the statements aided
the enemy, violated the selective service laws, discredited the House and were
inconsistent with the oath of office required of House members. Bond met the
constitutional requirements of age, citizenship and residency (GA. CONST. mt.
Ill, § 6), but the district court held that Bond had not been denied due process and that the House had a rational basis for excluding him, Furthennore,
the district court stated that to grant Bond relief would be to "crash through a
political thicket into a political quicksand." Powell v. McCmmack, 266 F. Supp.
354, 359 (D.D.C. 1967). The Supreme Court reversed the district court and
established judicial review of the exclusionary action of a state legislature.
However, the. political question doctrine still remained a potential barrier to
review of congressional decision.
1 • 395 U.S. at 522-48. Chief Justice Warren's periods are "the pre-conven·
lion precedent!;". "convention debates" and "post-ratification". Id.
1 Id. at 522. The Constitution specifically empowers both Homes to expel a
member by a two-thirds vote. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5.
u!d. at 527.
"Id. at 530.
18 Id. at 527 -8.
"'Id, at 532. Note specifically
pre-c9nvention
the
& State convention debates.
"'Id. at 542.
.
..
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In 1807 the House of Representatives seated William McCreery, who met the constitutional qualifications for membership
but did not meet additional residency requirements imposed by the
st:1.te of Maryland. The House election committee declared that
Congress cannot "prescribe" the qualifications of its members, but,
rather, it can only "judge" members in light of the Constitution.'"
Subsequent congressional practice has been "erratic", and some
members-elect meeting the constitutional requirements have been
excluded. However, Chief Justice Warren pointed out that even if
the criteria for exclusion had been more consistent, their precedential value would nevertheless be quite limited, since an act is not
rendered any less unconstitutional merely because it is repeated at a
later date."" History, therefore, confirms the conclusion of the
Powell court that "the Hous_e is without power to exclude any
member-elect who meets the Constitutional qualifications_ for membership.""" Furthermore, even had the intent of the Framers been
less apparent, the Court would nevertheless "have been compelled
to resolve any ambiguity in favor of a narrow construction of the
scope of Congress' power to exclude member-elect.''""
As a pragmatic technique of avoiding judicial review of potentially embarrassing issues, the political question doctrine historically
has been highly effective. Underlying the Court's understandable
reluctance to adjudicate thorny palitical questions is the judiciary's
obvious lack of the physical power to enforce its decisions. Regard-·
less of the strength of the theoretical foundations of a particular
course of judicial action, as a practical matter, the Court cannot
recklessly risk having its decisions ignored by the other branches.
It is arguable, however, that Marbury v. ·Madison"' established
the principle that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the
21 Id. at 543.
"'Id. at 546-7 .
..,id. at 547. But see The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HA1t.V. L. R.Ev.
62, 71-75 (1969) .
"'Id.
""5· UiS. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Two of the three issues which Professor
Van Alstyne has pinpointed in Marbury v. Madison could easily be transposed
ont.o the issues of Powell v. McCormack- "(1) Was the Secretary of State answerable in court for the conduct of his office? (2) Could the Court countermand
a pr~idential decision respecting a subordinate appointment? (3) By what means
could any such judicial decision possibly be enforced?" Van Alstyne, A. Critical
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Dmrn L- J. l, 5 (1969). In the Powell case,
the issues could be (1) Was the House answerable to the Court for the con.duct of its office? (2) Could the Court countermand a congressional decision
r.egarding legislative execlusion?
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judicial department to say what the law is,""" and that there is a
qualitative difference between the Court's interpretation of the
law and its usurpation of a function of a coordinate branch of
government." In the Powell case, the Court was called upon to
grant declaratory relief" - to declare that Powell had unconstitutionally been deprived of his seat in the House of Representatives.
It was not called upon actually to seat Powell. This distinction, although perhaps difficult to ascertain, is the essential distinction
between the functions of the judiciary and those of the other branches of government. Viewed in ,this manner, the political barriers of
the Baker definition, notably a commitment to a coordinate branch,
would become iminaterial.28
The vagueness of Article I, section 5 of the United States Constitution has led to considerable disagreement among legal scholars
as to the power of judicial review over the congressional· determination of the qualifications of its members."° The.Constitution does not
declare that Congress is to be the sole judge of the qualifications of
"'5 U.S. (I Cranch) 177 (1803) (emphasis added).
"Professor Finkelstein, who long ago charged the Court with a pragmatic
application of the political question doctrine, has suggested tbat the doctrine
of separation of powers which was employed in the Baker and Powell decision,
is useless as a .principle and even as a guide for the decision of cases. Finkelstein,
Judicial SelfLimitatiO'fl, 37 HARv. L. REv. 338, 344 (1924); Finkelstein, Further
Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 HARV. L REv. 221, 223 (1925). He argued
that the courts ar,e called upon to determine by whom certain powers shall be
exercised and if the pawers thus possessed have been validly exercised.. The
determination of the validity of an act is a different function from the actual
performance of the act: "Ciln the one case wt.; are seeking to ascertain upon
who devolves the duty of the particular service; in the other case we are merely
seeking to determine whether the Constitution has _been violated by anything
done or attempted by either an executive official or the legislature." Id.
""Petitioner's request for mandamus for back pay was remanded to the
district court. 395 U.S. at 550.
·
.. !169 U.S. at 217,
00 Judge Learned Hand has noted that the text of the Constiti911 at its emergence from the· Constitutional Convention in 1787 gave no ground for infening
that the decisions of the Supreme Court a."l.d, a f-0rtwri of the lower courts, were
to be authoritative vis-a-vis the legiBlature and executive; On the other hand,
without some arbiter of who was to make the final decision. the entire system
would have oollapsed; and it has been an accepted rule in the interpretation
of ·documents to interpolate into the text such provisions as are essential to
prevent the defeat of the "venture at hand". L. Hand, TME Bn.L OF Rmlffll 14, 15,
27, 29 (1958). This Power, Hand concluded, "is not a logkal deduction from the
sturcture of the Constitution, but only a practical condition upon its applica·
tion." Id. at 15. For the same approach, see Bickel, Forward: the Pas8ive Virtues,
75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
Professor Wechsler, disagreeing with Judge Hand, concluded that what is
crucial is "not the nature of the question hut the natu:re of the answer th~t may
be validly given by the courts", and that the poWer of Congress to jlidg!,!! the
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its members,"' and there is no apparent textual reason why Article
I, section 5 prevents judicial intervention. The ambiguous language
precludes an effective denial of judicial review on the basis of textual
commitment to Congress, as the Court makes evident in the Powell
decision.. Even the commitment of a question to a coordinate branch
of government would not necessarily render a question "palitical"
and therefore nonjusticiable."" The Powell case seems to establish
that subject matter or question alone, even when another department or branch is primarily concerned with it, does not forestalr
the courts from deciding the matter in question... Nor does the
"potentiality of embarrassment" from coordinate branches pose an
insurmountable barrier to judicial review.""
Diana Eve1'ett
qualifications of its members is beyond judicial review. Wechsler, T07))aTd Neutml
Principles of Canstitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 15 {1959).
Professor Scharpf has viewed the political que;tion doctrine as a discretionary
technique of avoidance, the effect of which is quite different from that of avoidance on jurisdictional or procedural grounds. Scharpf, Judicial Review &: the
Political Questioo: A FunctiO'l'lal Analysis, 75 YA:ut L.. J. 517, 536-!17 (1966).
Grants of power pursuant to Article 1, section 5 are essentially adjudicative
Scharpf concluded. Therefore, it is reasonable to construe the authorization of
these powers to Congress as an explicit exception to the Article I1i[ grant of
judicial power. Id. at 539-40.
Mr. Ralph Bean had concluded in a recent numbeT of this Review that Baker
v. Carr and subsequent decisions have led to the demise of the thn~e general
principles underlying the political question doctrine, namely, the Court's
non-interferrence with a matteT committed to another branch, the lack of judicially manageable standards and· "judicial non-intervention where the organization of a government is the basis of the complaint." Bean, The Supeme Courl
and the Political Question: Affirmation
Abdication'!,
or
71 W. VA. L. R.Ev. 97.
130 (1969). "The short of it is that respect for federalmm and the principle of
separation of powers as between the federal judiciary and the states have been
subordinated to concepts of individual liberty and equality for which the
Court claims to have no difficulty discovering standards." Id. at 1!11.
""U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5. The Constitution does grant the Senate the sole
power to impeach.
.. !195 U .s. at 521.
""Wesbetty v. Sanders, 376 U.S. l (1963). In his dissenting opinion, Mr.
Justice Harlan insisted that Congress has exclusive supervisory powers under
U.S. CoNST. art. l, § § 2, 4, 5. Id. at_ 23. See also Judge Tuttle's district court dissent in Wesberry v. SandeT~, 206 F, Supp. 276, .285 (1962), which the Supreme
Court noted.approvingly in Wesberry.
·
_ .. See Tollett, Political Questions mid the Loo!, 42 U. D:ii:r. 1.. J. 439, 468-70
(1965); cf. The Supreme. Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. R.Ev. 62 (1969}.
.. 369 U.S. at 217. The philosophical trend of the Baker and Powell decisions
was anticipated by Professor Weston in 192!,. "[T]be line between judicial
any political questions in given constitutional situation is the line drawn by
constitutional delegation and none other_ The actual delegation as it bas
occurred has depended upon men's current beliefs as to what ought to be delegated, upon their political and social theories and their notions of expediency."
Westoni, Political Questions,.. HARv. L. REY. 296, 331 (1925).
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